Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY
● The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by

2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand
      the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support
      of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as
      deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents
      obstacles to its national strategy.
      ● The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful
      nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that
      structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root
      causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.
      ‒
      In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political
      Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have
      implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against
      us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”
      ● The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness
      the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading
      position” in an enduring competition between systems.
      ● In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for
      an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s
      security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks,
      challenges, and trials.”
      FOREIGN POLICY
      ● The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
      strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to
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      OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the
      Party’s political and governing systems.
      ● Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European
      countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf
      warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.
      ● In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous
      year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI
      extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.
      ● Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
      PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
      II. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on
      Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding
      reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.
      ECONOMIC POLICY
      ● At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID policy. The decision to implement
      China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests
      against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local
      governments.
      ● The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of
      growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to
      basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green
      developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.
      ● The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of
      China’s broader national development aspirations.
      CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)
      ● The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global
      transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic
      integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.
      ● In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline.
      However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and
      Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy
      opportunities.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding
      its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.
      MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
      ●
      The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to
      “fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and
      Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.
      ● The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use
      technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and
      technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments
      of national power.
      ● Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil
      Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”
      DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY
      ● In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its
      sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for
      itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防
      御).
      ● PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by
      the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great
      modern socialist country.”
      ● In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party
      Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi
      to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.
      ● During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi
      reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the
      integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s
      armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a
      more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.
      ● In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
      Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR
      network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key
      vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to
      launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not
      significantly impact PLA combat readiness.
      FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION
      ● The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all
      warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime
      as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
      ● The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight
      and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States),
      counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project
      power globally.
      ● People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment
      and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world
      class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military
      response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The
      PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the
      policy are not clear.
      ● People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the
      world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140
      major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and
      submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
      ‒
      It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA)
      and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023. In the near-term,
      the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land
      targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles,
      notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
      ‒
      The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic
      zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international
      law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the
      same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including
      the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
      ● People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF and
      PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The
      PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize with
      the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the
      PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly
      revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term
      modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing
      new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require
      increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple
      independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
      ‒
      The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental
      range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the
      PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United
      States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
      ● Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established
      to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications,
      and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF’s Network Systems Department
      (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible
      for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare,
      technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s
      Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天
      部 队 ), is responsible for military space operations. The PRC continues to develop
      counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites,
      electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s
      access to and operations in the space domain.
      ●
      Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint
      strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian
      products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the
      movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.
      ● Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s
      SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level
      special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to
      conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it
      difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
      JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT
      ● The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade,
      deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct
      military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
      ● The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to
      strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain
      (FIC).
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION
      ● The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a
      presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold
      at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
      ● Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in
      all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are
      not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.
      ● Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS
      architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive
      early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also
      placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of
      its IADS.
      ● Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will
      continue to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system is possibly intended to replace some
      older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western
      Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.
      ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY
      ● The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information
      dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military
      exercises.
      ● The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict,
      which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced
      technologies at every level of warfare.
      ● The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch
      cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
      United States.
      SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES
      ● The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere
      and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication
      capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence,
      surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and
      meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.
      ● The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related
      technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as
      well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within
      their field of view and enable counterspace actions.
      NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
      ● Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its
      nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current
      efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.
      ● The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms
      while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion
      of its nuclear forces.
      ● In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC
      possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed
      previous projections.
      ● DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by
      2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its
      force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that
      year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military
      by 2049.
      ● The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce
      plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies
      are intended for peaceful purposes.
      ● The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
      2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into
      these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to
      increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW)
      posture.
      ● The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead
      with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current
      JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC
      littoral waters.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
      ● The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise
      oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This
      includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use
      applications.
      ● The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a
      threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.
      ● The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical
      Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on
      pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.
      OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY
      ● The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern,
      Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on
      the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats.
      ● Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the
      PLA conventional forces within the theater.
      ● In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring
      Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a
      dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.
      DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS
      ● The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its
      sovereignty.
      ● Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence
      in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil
      and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”
      ● During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS,
      including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in
      close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land
      features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on
      the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
      ● In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The
      PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait
      included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-
      declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.
      ● At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position
      that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force
      as an option.
      ● The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its
      August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023
      in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.
      PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR
      ● Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances
      of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past
      two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around
      100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in
      an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the
      region.
      ● Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft
      have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of
      closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other
      actions.
      ● The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of
      the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential
      for loss of life.
      THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE
      ● CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s
      international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national
      rejuvenation.
      ● The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders
      and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its
      foreign policy goals. This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion—
      and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN
      peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia.
      The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to
      COVID-19.
      PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS
      ● The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA
      to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military
      logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives
      evolve.
      ● Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and
      planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces
      projection.
      ● In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s
      Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA
      military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United
      Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia,
      Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.
      ● The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina,
      and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and
      ICBM launches.
      LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE
      ● The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine
      that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach
      to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.
      ● Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense
      and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.
      RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION
      ● The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused
      with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for
      modern military capabilities.
      ● The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including
      through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities
      to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.
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      Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
      ● In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 7.1 percent,
      continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position
      as the second-largest military spender in the world.
      DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY
      ● China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and
      many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.
      ● China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities
      that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.
      ● In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier,
      featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to
      deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.
      ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION
      ● The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to
      military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain
      access to information and advanced technologies.
      ● There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by
      PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as
      U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA
      modernization.
      DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022
      ● In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and
      DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely
      continued in 2023.
      ● The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States,
      combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk
      of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.
      ● DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition
      does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include
      ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding
      misperceptions.